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Abstract
In recent papers a new semantics, called Local Models Semantics, was presented and used to provide
a foundation to reasoning with contexts. Local Models Semantics captures and makes precise the two
main principles underlying contextual reasoning: the, so-called, Principle of Locality and Principle of
Compatibility. In this chapter we aim at explaining the main intuitions underlying Local Models Seman-
tics, its fundamental logical properties, and its relation with contextual reasoning. The emphasis is on
motivations and intuitions, rather than on technicalities.
1 Introduction
In recent papers a new semantics, called Local Models Semantics, was presented and used to provide a
foundation to reasoning with contexts. An exhaustive presentation of the notion of context is out of the
scope of this chapter.1 The notion of context we consider here is based on two significative (informal)
definitions independently proposed by Fausto Giunchiglia [14] and John McCarthy [20] in the late 80’s,
when context was introduced as an important means for formalising certain forms of reasoning.
According to [14], contexts are a tool for formalising the locality of reasoning:
Our intuition is that reasoning is usually performed on a subset of the global knowledge base. The notion
of context is used as a means of formalising this idea of localisation. Roughly speaking, we take a context
to be the set of facts used locally to prove a given goal plus the inference routines used to reason about
them (which in general are different for different sets of facts) [14].
In [20], contexts are introduced as a means for solving the problem of generality:
When we take the logic approach to AI, lack of generality shows up in that the axioms we devise to
express common sense knowledge are too restricted in their applicability for a general common sense
database [. . . ] Whenever we write an axiom, a critic can say that the axiom is true only in a certain
context. With a little ingenuity the critic can usually devise a more general context in which the precise
form of the axiom doesn’t hold. [19]
Coherently with these two proposals, contexts have been used in various applications and in different
domains. Contexts are used to deal with issues concerning the integration of heterogeneous knowledge
and data bases. See for instance [7; 21; 12; 24]. The largest common-sense knowledge-base, CYC [18],
contains an explicit notion of context [17]. Several references can be found in the literature about the use
of contexts in the formalisation of reasoning about beliefs, meta reasoning, and propositional attitudes.
∗Most of the material presented in this paper is based on the article [Ghidini and Giunchiglia, 2001] with title “Local Models
Semantics, or Contextual Reasoning = Locality + Compatibility”.
1The interested reader may refer to [1; 10; 14] for an accurate discussion on this topic.
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See for instance [16; 13; 3; 8; 9; 15]. In [2] contexts are introduced in the formalisation of reasoning with
viewpoints. [5] addresses the problem of formalising context-based common-sense reasoning. Finally, [4; 6;
23; 22; 11] introduce contexts to model different aspects of agents and multi-agent systems.
In spite of the variety of different approaches, formalisations, and domains of application, in [10] the
authors claim that there are two main intuitions underlying the use of context, and state them as the
following two principles:
Principle 1 (of Locality): reasoning uses only part of what is potentially available (e.g., what is known,
the available inference procedures). The part being used while reasoning is what we call context (of
reasoning);
Principle 2 (of Compatibility): there is compatibility among the reasoning performed in different con-
texts.
Local Models Semantics provides a formal framework where the two principles of Locality and Compat-
ibility are captured and made precise. The goal of this chapter is to explain the main intuitions underlying
Local Models Semantics, its fundamental logical properties, and its relations with contextual reasoning. The
emphasis is on motivations and intuitions, rather than on technicalities. The reader interested in a more
technical presentation and a detailed comparison with other logical frameworks may refer to [10]
The chapter is organised as follows. The core definitions are given in Sections 3 and Section 4. In Section 5
we comment on the properties of Local Models Semantics. In particular we investigate how the notion of
context is formally defined within Local Models Semantics, and how Local Models Semantics captures the
principles of Locality and Compatibility introduced above. In Section 6 we comment on how Local Models
Semantics is able to deal with situations where we may or may not have a complete description of the world.
To make the presentation clearer, in Section 2 we introduce a simple example of reasoning with viewpoints,
called the magic box example, which will be used throughout the chapter. This example is a variation of the
one originally proposed in [10].
2 The magic box example
Suppose there are two observers, Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink, each having a partial view of a box as shown in
Figure 1. The box is composed of six sectors, each sector possibly containing a ball. There must be exactly
Mr. Blue Mr. Pink
Figure 1: The magic box.
two balls in the box and there cannot be balls hidden from the view of an observer. The box is “magic”
and observers cannot distinguish the depth inside it. Figure 2 shows the views of Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink
corresponding to the scenario depicted in Figure 1.
In this example we focus on the two contexts describing the viewpoints of the two observers and the
consequences that they are able to draw from it. The content of the two contexts corresponding to the
scenario depicted in Figure 1 is graphically represented in Figure 2.
It is easy to see that the notions of locality and compatibility play a central role in this example. First
locality. Both Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink have the notions of a ball being on the right or on the left. However we
may have a ball which is on the right for Mr. Blue and not on the right for Mr. Pink. Furthermore Mr. Pink
has the notion of “a ball being in the center of the box” which is meaningless for Mr. Blue. We also assume
that the box is made of different coloured glass. Different observers, looking at the box from different sides,
2
Mr. Blue Mr. Pink
Figure 2: The contexts of Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink.
see the balls as if in different colours. In our example Mr. Blue sees (has the notion of) a ball being blue,
while Mr. Pink sees (has the notion of) a ball being pink.
Focusing on compatibility, the contents of the contexts of Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink are obviously related.
The relation is a consequence of the fact that Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink see the same box. Given the fact
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Mr. Blue’s contexts Mr. Pink’s contexts
Figure 3: Compatible contexts of Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink.
that there must be exactly two balls in the box, it is easy to see that if Mr. Blue sees only one blue ball
in the box, then Mr. Pink must see two pink balls in the box. Therefore we can describe this situation by
listing all the possible compatible pairs (as they are represented in Figure 3), or we can describe it more
synthetically using descriptions like: “if Mr. Blue sees a single blue ball then Mr. Pink sees two pink balls”
and “if Mr. Pink sees a single pink ball then Mr. Pink sees two blue balls”.
3 Local models and model
We begin here the presentation of Local Models Semantics by defining the notions of local model and model.
3.1 The formal definitions
Let {Li}i∈I be a family of languages defined over a set of indexes I (in the following we drop the index
i ∈ I). Intuitively, each Li is the formal language used to describe what is true in a context. For the purpose
of our work we suppose that I is at most countable and that {Li} is a class of propositional languages. The
first step towards the definition of a model for {Li} is to consider the class of models for each language Li in
3
{Li}. This will ensure that each language Li is interpreted in its own, possibly different, structure. Formally,
we denote with M i the class of all the models of Li. We call m ∈M i a local model (of Li).
Then, we have to pair local models into a single structure. This is done by introducing the notions
of compatibility sequence and compatibility relation. Formally, a compatibility sequence c (for {Li}) is a
sequence
c = 〈c0, c1, . . . , ci, . . .〉
where, for each i ∈ I, ci is a subset of M i. We call ci the i-th element of c. If I = {1, 2} is composed of two
indexes, a compatibility sequence c is of the form c = 〈c1, c2〉 and is called a compatibility pair.
A compatibility relation C (for {Li}) is a set C = {c} of compatibility sequences c.
2
We define a model as a compatibility relation which contains at least one sequence and does not contain
the sequence of empty sets. Formally, a model (for {Li}) is a compatibility relation C such that:
1. C 6= ∅;
2. 〈∅, ∅, . . . , ∅, . . .〉 6∈ C.
In the following we write C to mean either a compatibility relation or a model, the context always makes
clear what we mean.
In a nutshell, we can split the construction we perform into three steps. First, we start with some
language, say L1, L2, and L3 (see Figure 4). Then, we associate each Li with a set Mi ⊆M i of local models.
Usually Mi ⊂M i (see Figure 5). Finally, we pair local models inside compatibility sequences. The resulting
compatibility relation is our model (see Figure 6).3 Local models describe what is locally true. Compatibility
sequences put together local models which are “mutually compatible”, consistently with the situation we
are describing. What we obtain are models composed of sets of “mutually compatible” sequences of local
models.
Given a family of languages {Li}, different classes of models may be defined, depending on the definition
of compatibility relation. Different compatibility relations model different situations. A general class of
models which will be used often in the chapter is based on the notion of chain. A compatibility sequence c
is a chain if all the ci contain exactly one local model (formally, if |ci|=1 for each i ∈ I). A model C is a
chain model if all the c in C are chains.
3.2 A model for the magic box
Let us apply the three step construction of the model depicted in Figures 4, 5, and 6 to the magic box
example.
Languages We define the propositional languages LB and LP used by Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink, respectively,
to describe their views. Let PB = {r, l} and PP = {r, c, l} be two sets of propositional constants. Intuitively,
r, c, l stand for ball on the right, in the center and on the left, respectively. LB is formally defined as the
smallest set containing PP , the symbol for falsity ⊥, and closed under implication; LP is formally defined
as the smallest set containing P2, the symbol for falsity ⊥ and closed under implication. In this chapter we
use the standard abbreviations from propositional logic, such as ¬φ for φ ⊃ ⊥, φ ∨ ψ for ¬φ ⊃ ψ, φ ∧ ψ for
¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ), > for ⊥ ⊃ ⊥.
Local models We construct all the possible situations (local models) for LB and LP . LB and LP have
the usual propositional semantics. Therefore the local models of LB and LP are univocally defined by sets
of propositional formulae. In particular, the local models of LB are univocally denoted by the following sets
of formulae:
m1 = {l} m2 = {r} m3 = {l, r}
2Formally, let
∏
i∈I
2Mi be the Cartesian product of the collection {2M i : i ∈ I}. The compatibility relation C is a relation
of type C ⊆
∏
i∈I
2Mi
3Figures 4, 5, and 6 first appeared in [10].
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Figure 4: Languages: L1, L2, and L3.
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3
Figure 5: Local models for L1, L2, and L3.
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c 2
2L
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3
Figure 6: Model for {L1, L2, L3}.
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where we write {l} to mean the local model describing the situation with a ball on the left, {r} to mean the
local model describing the situation with a ball on the right, and {l, r} describing the situation with a ball
on the left and a ball on the right.
Analogously, the local models of LP are univocally denoted by the following sets of formulae:
m1 = {l} m2 = {c} m3 = {r}
m4 = {l, c} m5 = {l, r} m6 = {c, r}.
Remember that there must be exactly two balls in the magic box. For this reason {l, c, r} is not a local
model describing a viewpoint of Mr. Pink.
Compatibility relations and model Following the definition given in Section 3, a generic compatibility
pair for the magic box is a pair 〈cB , cP 〉 where cB is a set of models of the view of Mr. Blue and cP is a set
of models of the view of Mr. Pink. A model is a set of compatibility pairs.
In order to construct a model for the scenario described in Figure 3 (Section 2), we impose the following
compatibility constraints:
if Mr. Blue sees a single blue ball
then Mr. Pink sees two pink balls
(1)
if Mr. Pink sees a single pink ball
then Mr. Blue sees two blue balls
(2)
Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink are able to construct
a complete description of their view
(3)
Notationally we use the following shorthand:
• one(l, r) for (l ∨ r) ∧ ¬(l ∧ r);
• one(l, c, r) for (l ∨ c ∨ r) ∧ ¬(l ∧ r) ∧ ¬(l ∧ c) ∧ ¬(c ∧ r);
• two(l, c, r) for ((l ∧ r) ∨ (l ∧ c) ∨ (c ∧ r)) ∧ ¬(l ∧ c ∧ r).
Constraints (1)-(3) are captured, at a formal level, by the following definition. A model C for the magic
box is a compatibility relation such that, for all c ∈ C
if cB satisfies one(l, r) then cP satisfies two(l, c, r) (4)
if cP satisfies one(l, c, r) then cB satisfies l ∧ r (5)
|cB | = 1 and |cP | = 1 (6)
Let us explore in detail the relation between the informal compatibility constraints (1)-(3) and Equations
(4)-(6). Equation (4) models constraint (1). In fact, if Mr. Blue sees a ball then this ball can be on the
left or on the right and the formula one(l, r) describes his view. Furthermore, in this case, Mr. Pink sees
two balls in two of the three possible positions, and, therefore two(l, c, r) represents his view. A similar
explanation can be given for Equation (5), which models constraint (2). Equation (6) is more interesting. It
says that cB and cP contain a single local model, i.e., the magic box model is a chain model. This intuitively
means that both Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink see the box (from their point of view) and are able to construct
a complete description of it. As a consequence of Equation (6), a model C for the magic box example in
Figure 3 is a set of pairs 〈{mB}, {mP }〉 where mB and mP are local models of LB and LP , respectively.
Each pair corresponds to a possible combination of the observers’ partial views. The model C containing
all and only the compatibility pairs depicted in Figure 3 is represented in Equation (7). All the models
6
satisfying Equations (4)-(6) are subsets of this model.
C =


〈{l}, {l, c}〉, 〈{l}, {l, r}〉,
〈{l}, {c, r}〉, 〈{r}, {l, c}〉,
〈{r}, {l, r}〉, 〈{r}, {c, r}〉,
〈{l, r}, {l}〉, 〈{l, r}, {c}〉,
〈{l, r}, {r}〉, 〈{l, r}, {l, c}〉,
〈{l, r}, {l, r}〉, 〈{l, r}, {c, r}〉


(7)
As a final remark notice that linking local models inside a model may force us to eliminate some of
them. Suppose that we restrict ourselves to consider local models for Mr. Blue which allow for exactly one
ball. This leads to the definition of the two local models {l} and {r} for LB depicted on the lefthand side
in Figure 7, and of the six possible local models {l}, {c}, {r}, {l, c}, {l, r}, {c, r} for LP depicted on the
righthand side in Figure 7. We know that if Mr. Blue sees a single ball, then Mr. Pink must see two balls.
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Mr. Blue’s contexts Mr. Pink’s contexts
Figure 7: Mr. Blue sees exactly one ball: the local models.
As a consequence, the model for the situation in which Mr. Blue sees exactly one ball does not contain any
pair, and corresponding local models for Mr. Pink, which represent that Mr. Pink sees a single ball. The
resulting model is indeed the following:


〈{l}, {l, c}〉, 〈{l}, {l, r}〉,
〈{l}, {c, r}〉, 〈{r}, {l, c}〉,
〈{r}, {l, r}〉, 〈{r}, {c, r}〉


and is graphically represented in Figure 8.
4 Satisfiability and logical consequence
The definition of satisfiability of a formula of a language Li in the model C, is based on the satisfiability
of the same formula in the local models of Li. Formally, let |=cl be the satisfiability relation between local
models and formulae of Li. We call |=cl local satisfiability. Notationally, let us write i:φ to mean φ, where φ
is a formula of Li. We say that φ is an Li-formula, and that i:φ is a formula or, also, a labelled Li-formula.
This notation and terminology allows us to keep track of the context we are talking about.
Let C = {c} with c = 〈c0, c1, . . . , ci, . . .〉 be a model and i : φ a formula. C satisfies i : φ, in symbols
C |= i:φ, if for all c ∈ C
7
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Mr. Blue’s contexts Mr. Pink’s contexts
Figure 8: Mr. Blue sees exactly one ball: the model.
ci |= φ
where ci |= φ if, for all m ∈ ci, m |=cl φ.
The intuition underlying the motion of satisfiability is that an Li-formula is satisfied by a model C if all
the local models in each ci satisfy it.
Consider, for instance, the simple model
C′ =
{
〈{l}, {c, r}〉, 〈{l, r}, {l, c}〉
}
(8)
containing only the two compatibility pairs depicted in Figure 9. According to the definition of satisfiability
C′ satisfies the formula B: l, meaning that Mr. Blue sees a ball in the left position. This is because the two
local models {l} and {l, r} for LB contained in C
′ both satisfy the formula l. On the contrary, C′ does not
satisfy B: r, meaning that Mr. Blue sees a ball in the right position. This is because there is a local model
for Mr. Blue, namely {l}, which does not satisfy the formula r.
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Figure 9: Mr. Blue sees a ball on the left.
The notions of satisfiability of a set of formulae and of validity are the obvious ones. A model C satisfies
a set of formulae Γ, in symbols C |= Γ, if C satisfies every formula i : φ in Γ. A formula i : φ is valid, in
symbols |= i:φ, if all models satisfy i:φ.
An interesting notion is the one of logical consequence which must take into account the fact that as-
sumptions and conclusion may belong to distinct languages. Given a set of labelled formulae Γ, Γj denotes
the set of formulae {γ |j:γ ∈ Γ}. A formula i:φ is a logical consequence of a set of formulae Γ w.r.t. a model
C, in symbols Γ |=
C
i:φ, if every sequence c ∈ C satisfies:
∀j ∈ I, j 6= i, cj |= Γj =⇒ (∀m ∈ ci, m |=cl Γi =⇒ m |=cl φ) (9)
Equation (9) looks slightly complicated. Let us illustrate it with the help of an example. Consider the
model of the magic box informally depicted in Figure 3 and formally represented by Equation (7). We want
to verify that in this model
(10) if Mr. Blue sees a ball on the left and no ball on the right, and Mr. Pink doesn’t see any ball in
the center, then Mr. Pink sees a ball on the left and a ball on the right.
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Formally, the sentence (10) can be rewritten as
B: l ∧ ¬r, P :¬c |=
C
P : l ∧ r
The set of assumption Γ contains the facts that “Mr. Blue sees a ball on the left and no ball on the right”
and “Mr. Pink doesn’t see any ball in the center”. Formally, Γ = {B : l ∧ ¬r, P : ¬c}. The first step is to
isolate the set of assumptions which are made in a context different from the context of Mr. Pink. That is
B: l∧¬r. Then we restrict ourselves to considering all the compatibility pairs whose local models satisfy the
formula B: l ∧ ¬r, and throw away all the others. The remaining compatibility pairs are
〈{l}, {l, c}〉
〈{l}, {l, r}〉
〈{l}, {c, r}〉
and are depicted in Figure 10. Consider now the local models of Mr. Pink in the remaining sequences. We
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Figure 10: Selecting compatibility sequences.
have to identify all the local models of Mr. Pink in the remaining pairs such that there is no ball in the
center. Formally, we have to identify all the local models of Mr. Pink satisfying P :¬c. The only local model
satisfying that Mr. Pink doesn’t see any ball in the center is
{l, r}
and is depicted in Figure 11. The last step is to check whether the remaining local models of Mr. Pink
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Figure 11: Selecting local models.
represent the fact that Mr. Pink sees a ball on the left and a ball on the right. It is easy to see that the
9
only remaining local model in Figure 11 satisfies this property. Therefore the model depicted in Figure 3
and formally defined in Equation (7) satisfies the sentence (10).
The extension of the notion of logical consequence to a class of models is the usual one. A formula i:φ
is a logical consequence of a set of formulae Γ w.r.t. a class of models M, in symbols Γ |=
M
i: φ, if i: φ is a
logical consequence of Γ w.r.t. all the models in M. Finally, a formula i: φ is a logical consequence of Γ, in
symbols Γ |= i:φ, if i:φ is a logical consequence of Γ w.r.t. all models C.
5 Contexts, locality and compatibility
Having formally defined the logical framework, the question now is: where are contexts in this picture? How
does Local Models Semantics relate to contextual reasoning? We already suggested part of the answer to this
question by illustrating the main notions of model and satisfiability using the magic box example. In this
section we answer these questions in more detail by illustrating how the notion of context can be formally
introduced in the framework of Local Models Semantics. We then examine how Local Models Semantics
formally captures the notions of locality and compatibility.
Given a model C = {〈c0, c1, . . . , ci, . . .〉} we formally define a context to be any ci, namely the set of
local models m ∈M i allowed by C within any particular compatibility sequence. For instance, the contexts
for Mr. Blue allowed by the model C′ defined in Equation (8) are {l} and {l, r}.
The intuition underlying the definition of context is that a context consists of that set of models which
capture exactly those facts which are locally true, given also the constraints posed by the local models of
other contexts in the same compatibility sequence. This notion of context is the semantic formalisation of
the notion of context intuitively introduced in Principle 1 in Section 1.
An interesting property of this definition is that contexts are formalised as partial objects, as explicitly
required in, e.g., [14; 19]. This is due to the fact that context is defined as a set of models instead of a
single model. In order to illustrate the advantage of having contexts as partial objects consider the slightly
modified magic box scenario depicted in Figure 12, where Mr. Pink is able to see only one box sector and
knows that there are two sectors behind the wall. In this scenario Mr. Pink is able to distinguish only two
Mr. Blue Mr. Pink
Figure 12: A partially hidden magic box.
situations: there is a ball on the left, and there is no ball on the left. The fact that Mr. Pink is uncommitted
to whether there is a ball in a sector behind the wall is formalised by having the sentences “there is a ball
on the right” and “there is a ball in the center” true in some local models representing the view of Mr. Pink
and false in others. In the resulting context, describing the viewpoint of Mr. Pink, “there is a ball on the
right” and “there is a ball in the center” will be neither true or false because there will be models in cP
where these sentences are false and others where the same sentences are true. Formally, the model for the
scenario depicted in Figure 12 is defined as follows
C∗ =


〈{l}, {{c}, {r}, {c, r}}〉,
〈{r}, {{c}, {r}, {c, r}}〉,
〈{l, r}, {{c}, {r}, {c, r}}〉,
〈{l}, {{l}, {l, c}, {l, r}}〉,
〈{r}, {{l}, {l, c}, {l, r}}〉,
〈{l, r}, {{l}, {l, c}, {l, r}}〉


(11)
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and is graphically represented in Figure 13. It is easy to see that the two contexts for Mr. Pink allowed by
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Figure 13: Model for the scenario of Figure 12.
the model C∗ are {{c}, {r}, {c, r}} and {{l}, {l, c}, {l, r}}. In these contexts the formulae r and c are neither
true or false. Consider, for instance, the context {{c}, {r}, {c, r}} and the formula r. r is neither true or false
in {{c}, {r}, {c, r}} because there is a local model {c} where r is false and another local model {r} where r
is true.
Given the above notion of context, we can now better illustrate the intuitions underlying the notions of
compatibility sequence, compatibility relation, and model. A context is a partial description of the world.
A compatibility sequence contains as many contexts as needed, one for each partial description of the world.
Thus, in the magic box scenario we have compatibility sequences of length two, containing a context for the
view of Mr. Blue and a context for the view of Mr. Pink. In the more general scenario involving n observers,
we have to consider sequences of length n.
An interesting set of compatibility sequences is the one composed by chains introduced at the end of
Section 3. Remember that a chain is a compatibility sequence in which all the contexts are singleton sets.
In this case, all the contexts are complete objects in the sense that each context, being a single model,
assigns a truth value to all sentences in its language. In other words, a context which is a singleton set
models the situation where a partial description of the world assigns a truth value to all the propositions it
is able to express in its local (and limited) language. This is the case in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Here, Mr. Blue
and Mr. Pink have partial views of the world. However, within their partial views, they are able to “see
everything”. On the contrary, this is not the case in Figures 12 and 13. Here, Mr. Blue is still able to “see
everything” within its partial views, while Mr. Pink is not.
Local Models Semantics completely embraces the principle of Locality. We can easily say that everything
is local. First of all, the languages are local to the contexts. Second, the languages are interpreted in local
structures (or local models). This reflects the fact that contexts can have their own, generally different,
domains of interpretation, sets of relations, and sets of functions. Third, the notion of satisfiability is local:
the satisfiability of a (labelled) formula is given in terms of the local satisfiability of the formula with respect
to its context.
Because of compatibility sequences, contexts mutually influence themselves. Compatibility has the struc-
tural effect of changing the set of local models defining each context. It forces local models to agree up to a
certain extent. A typical example is the one depicted in Figure 8, where the fact that Mr. Blue sees exactly
a ball forces us to throw away all the pairs, and corresponding local models for Mr. Pink, which allow for
zero balls.
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6 From contexts to the world
In learning about our approach to the formalisation of the magic box example, the reader might object
that the most straightforward formalisation of this example would be a direct axiomatisation of the box as
a two-dimensional grid. The contexts representing the views of Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink could then easily
Mr. Blue Mr. PinkMr. Blue Mr. Pink
Figure 14: Indistinguishable situations.
be constructed by projecting the grid in two one-dimensional views. Locality and compatibility would be
guaranteed by construction. However this approach is based on the hypothesis that we have a complete
description of the world (the box in this case), and that we can use it to build views of the world itself.
This is not always the case. Quite often we have only partial views and it is possible that we are not able
to reconstruct the complete description of the world starting from the partial views, but only a partial or
approximate description of it. As an example, consider the situations depicted in Figure 14. These two
different situations cannot be distinguished by the two observers. That is, even assuming the existence of a
third agent who knows the actual form of the box, (s)he is not able to identify which situation, among the
ones depicted in Figure 14, is the current one, knowing only what Mr. Blue and Mr. Pink see. In fact, the
unique pair of compatible contexts associated to the two different situations in Figure 14 is the one depicted
in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: Compatible contexts in the scenario of Figure 14.
The capability of dealing with situations where we may or may not have a complete description of the
world is quite important in several application domains. Among the most important is the development
and integration of data or knowledge bases. In a relational, possibly distributed, data base there is what is
assumed to be a complete description of the world, and views are built by filtering out, and appropriately
merging together, part of the available information. On the other hand, a federation of heterogeneous data
or knowledge bases, possibly developed independently, can be seen as a set of views of an ideal data base
which is often impossible or very complex to reconstruct completely.
An exhaustive investigation on the relation between partial views and a complete description of the world
is out of the scope of this chapter. Our aim here is to highlight the problem and suggest how Local Models
Semantics is able to deal with situations where we may or may not have a complete description of the world
in (simple) scenarios from the magic box example. In order to do that, consider the following scenario. The
box is the same as the one depicted in Figure 1, but this time the balls have to be placed in the same column
(i.e., there cannot be balls on a diagonal line). Figure 16 shows all the possible configurations allowed in
this scenario from a top view of the box.
It is very easy to show that in this case the observers can distinguish between all the possible situations.
Figure 17 graphically describes the compatibility pairs involving the three different possible situations for
Mr. Blue and the six different possible situations for Mr. Pink.
The graphical model depicted in Figure 17 doesn’t look very different from the one depicted in Figure 3.
So, why in this case the observers are able to distinguish between all the possible situations? Because in
12
Figure 16: A new magic box.
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 
		
		
		
		

 


 


 


 





 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 
Mr. Blue’s contexts Mr. Pink’s contexts
Figure 17: Compatible contexts in the scenario of Figure 16.
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Figure 18: One-to-one correspondence.
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this case it is possible to find a precise correspondence between the compatibility pairs in Figure 17 and
the complete description of the box provided by the top views in Figure 16. More formally, it is possible to
find a bijective4 function f from the set of compatibility pairs C, graphically defined in Figure 17, to the
set of models graphically defined in Figure 16. This function enables a one-to-one correspondence between
every compatibility pair in Figure 17 and one of the possible descriptions of the box, in Figure 16. Figure 18
provides a graphical description of f .
Let C be a compatibility relation and M a set of models intuitively representing a complete description
of the world. We believe that the capability of defining a bijective function f from C to M is a necessary
condition for stating that C enables the reconstruction of a complete description of the world. Is this
condition also a sufficient one? Due to the infinite varieties of relations existing between different views
of the world we are not able to give a definite answer in this chapter. Nonetheless, one-to-one functions
can provide a preliminary mechanism for controlling whether a certain model C provides a description of
different views of the world which enables the reconstruction of a complete description of the world.
7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explained a new semantics, called Local Models Semantics, which was recently
proposed as a foundation to reasoning with context. Local Models Semantics formalises the two general
principles underlying contextual reasoning, namely the principle of locality and the principle of compatibility.
We have also shown how Local Models Semantics can be used to model a characteristic example of reasoning
with viewpoints: the magic box example.
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